


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THE FOURTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

(13 - 17 January 1975)

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THE FOURTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

SUMMARY

1. The PRC's long-delayed Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), held from 13-17 January, formalized state reforms resulting from the cultural revolution. It laid out a moderate economic course, placed old-line bureaucrats in most top state positions, reaffirmed party control over state affairs, and further reduced military influence over civil affairs. The NPC's appointment of Chang Chun-chao as a vice premier and the promotion of Teng Hsiao-ping to party vice chairman at the preceding party plenum (8-10 January) seem designed to insure orderly succession to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung.
2. While Mao was not present at either the NPC or the party plenum, the fact that the NPC was held suggests he had no major disagreements with the programs adopted. Certain elements may be dissatisfied with the current power balance, including Chiang Ching and some military leaders, but it seems doubtful they would be able to upset the balance without support from Mao. One of Chiang Ching's proteges was made minister of culture, but none of the other appointees have been closely associated with her.
3. The brief NPC session, like the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, was held in secret, with the first announcement on 18 January, the day after the session concluded. On the first day the congress heard the main government report by Premier Chou En-lai and a report by Chang Chun-chiao on the new constitution, which is generally similar to a 1970 draft constitution except for deletions of fulsome praise of Mao. The constitution eliminates the office of chief of state, handing over most of its protocol duties to the NPC, and it provides for the party chairman (now Mao) assuming the post of commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
4. Chou En-lai's report to the NPC made pro forma bows to revolution, but focused on a blueprint for economic progress which leaves little leeway for revolutionary disorders. Chou hailed the victory of the cultural revolution as the most important event of the past 10 years, referred repeatedly to Mao's role in formulating policy, and stated that the "primary task" is to deepen the anti-Lin Piao and Confucius movement. However, he did not suggest a revival of mass movements, but rather stressed that ideological study and cadre labor would be the primary tools for

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insuring proletarian rule. Chou supplied little detail in enumerating PRC economic achievements, but he did claim that the current five-year plan would be successfully completed this year. Chou stated that future economic planning would proceed on lines ordered by Mao prior to the Third NPC 10 years ago: The economy would be developed in two stages with the first stage due for completion in 1980, and the second stage--putting China among the front ranks of developed countries--would be completed by the end of the century.

5. In his remarks on foreign affairs, Chou portrayed a favorable world situation in which the superpowers are declining while the power of the Third World is increasing. Chou acknowledged that the United States, along with China, had worked to improve bilateral relations and he foresaw further improvements if the principles of the Shanghai communique were carried out in earnest. On the other hand, he was notably harsh in remarks on the Soviet Union. While Chou as usual called for maintenance of normal state relations, he voiced the first authoritative Chinese public protest over lack of progress in the Sino-Soviet border talks, and in fact characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill.

6. A chart listing the officials appointed as vice premiers of the State Council or as ministers appears in an appendix following the text of this report. The chart lists new positions filled by the NPC, along with other major offices held by the appointees, their previous state offices, and their status during the cultural revolution.

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THE FOURTH CHINESE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

I. REAFFIRMATION OF PARTY CONTROL OVER STATE

The long-awaited Fourth NPC formally reaffirmed party control over the state, generally placed the state apparatus in the hands of experienced bureaucrats, and indicated that Teng Hsiao-ping and Chang Chun-chiao will be in charge of day-to-day government operations. Party control over the government was assured by naming eight active Politburo members and alternates as vice premiers. Party control over the army was formalized by a constitutional change making the CCP chairman commander in chief of the PLA.

The Fourth NPC was a smaller, much briefer session than the Third NPC. Some 2,884 deputies attended the recent Congress compared with the 3,040 deputies who gathered in Peking for two weeks in December 1964-January 1965. Whereas no report was issued on the Fourth NPC until it had concluded, the Third NPC was a relatively open affair with daily NCNA reports wrapping up discussion of the major reports delivered at the congress. The Fourth NPC, in conformity with the cultural revolution injunction to simplify administration, approved reduction of the number of ministers on the State Council from 40 to 29. The session made only a token bow to youthful activists, though the new constitution reiterates the principle of leadership by "the old, the middle-aged, and the young."

TENG, CHANG IN LEADING ROLES

The selection of Teng Hsiao-ping and Chang Chun-chiao as party vice chairman and vice premier, respectively, seems aimed at insuring an orderly succession. The two leaders stood on opposite sides during the cultural revolution, but they bring similar experiences in the party bureaucracy to their state roles. Teng was CCP secretary-general until his purge in 1966. There was extensive denunciation of him in the Red Guard press, but not in the official media. His rise to top leadership again has been a rapid one, since he was only rehabilitated as a vice premier in 1973. He was named to the Central Committee at the 10th Party Congress in August 1973; apparently was coopted onto the Politburo at the end of that year; acted, along with Li Hsien-nien, in substituting for Premier Chou last year; and was named a party vice chairman at the second party plenum held prior to the NPC.

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Chang has been active in central party affairs since the cultural revolution, and was secretary-general of the 10th Party Congress. Although never publicly named as secretary-general, his delivery of the report on the constitution to the NPC on behalf of the party suggests that he has continued to act in that role. Chang was a party secretary in Shanghai at the beginning of the cultural revolution, having risen to the post through the municipal literary bureaucracy in the years since 1949. With Yao Wen-yuan, he supported Chiang Ching's cultural reforms and helped launch the struggle that produced the cultural revolution, becoming a deputy head of the cultural revolution group in 1966. After the "January Revolution" in Shanghai in 1967, he was entrusted with running the city by the central authorities. He was named to the Politburo at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 and to its Standing Committee at the 10th Party Congress. Since 1970, he has spent most of his time in Peking, but has not been openly active in the cultural field in which he first achieved prominence. Judging by the economic policies espoused by Shanghai media during his tenure there, Chang is an economic moderate who believes in central planning and central allocation of resources.

The party and state power wielded by Teng and Chang clearly overshadows that held by any other leaders under Mao and Chou except for Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, a longtime Chou ally who, as a professional military commander, is not thought to be eligible for the top party or state posts. Yeh was named defense minister by the NPC but was not made a vice premier, presumably to indicate the limits of his state control.

According to Western press reports, quoting officials in the PRC foreign ministry, Teng has also been made chief of the PLA general staff and Chang head of the PLA general political department.* These appointments further indicate the importance assigned by China's civilian leaders to the task of bringing the army firmly under civilian party control. It is not likely that either Teng or Chang will devote much time to PLA responsibilities. Former Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, rehabilitated just last year, seems likely to assume day-to-day control over the military structure. Teng was long active in the PLA but as a political commissar, not a commander. Chang held purely civilian posts in Shanghai until he was named political commissar of the Nanking Military Region subsequent to becoming Shanghai municipal chief in the cultural revolution.

* If usual Chinese practice is followed, neither appointment will be publicly announced. Rather, NCNA is likely to mention the new military identifications when these officials attend some public function in their military capacity.

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II. DOMINANCE OF OLD-LINE BUREAUCRATS IN STATE POSTS

All members of the Politburo except for Mao, his chief bodyguard Wang Tung-hsing, and Chi Teng-kuei appeared at the NPC session. Chi, who was one of the eight Politburo members named vice premier, appeared publicly in that position on 26 January, hosting a Romanian counterpart. NCNA's 18 January list of state leaders listed the vice premiers in apparent party rank, with Teng first and Chang second, followed by Li Hsien-nien, who has alternated with Teng in performing Chou's protocol duties while Chou has been in the hospital. Peking PLA commander Chen Hsi-lien was the only active military leader among the vice premiers. Alternate Politburo member Wu Kuei-hsien, a former model worker from Shensi, was named China's first woman vice premier. Non-Politburo members named as vice premiers were two ministers, Yu Chiu-li and Ku Mu, former minister Wang Chen, and Sun Chien, a young Tientsin factory worker who became an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1973.

MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS

Of the 29 ministers appointed by the NPC, over half were already serving in their current positions, and three held the identical positions prior to the cultural revolution. At least eight were vice ministers of the same ministry or a predecessor ministry before the cultural revolution, and one headed another ministry at that time. Three ministers appointed since the cultural revolution were replaced by the NPC. All three had military backgrounds and their departure may reflect continuing moves to reduce PLA power in civil affairs. Not all of the military men brought into ministries during the cultural revolution were removed, however. It is possible that those remaining have chosen to resign from the PLA rather than leave their posts.

In areas which have been especially contentious since the cultural revolution--culture and education--a Chiang Ching supporter, Yu Hui-yung, was named minister of culture and an old Chou En-lai subordinate, Chou Jung-hsin, was given the ministry of education. Yu has been in the cultural group under the State Council, which has presumably been superseded by the new ministry, and was named a deputy chief of the group last year. Yu is the composer of two model operas and has frequently praised Chiang Ching. In a speech reprinted in RED FLAG in May 1967, he noted Chiang's personal leadership over culture and said that in the model operas, "Every word and sentence, every tune and beat, is permeated with the heart blood of Comrade Chiang Ching." Chou served as secretary-general of the State Council prior to the cultural revolution and was also a vice-minister of education from 1961-63.

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Only two critical ministries are headed by Politburo members. Yeh Chien-ying formally assumed control of the defense ministry, which he has headed in fact since Lin Piao's demise, and Hua Kuo-feng was named minister of public security. Hua came up through the bureaucracy in Hunan and became the top official there in 1970. He has spent most of his time in Peking in recent years and was elected to the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Hua was concurrently elected a vice premier by the NPC, but Yeh was not--apparently another sign of Peking's sensitivity about giving civil power to military leaders.

NPC LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTATIVES

Most of the NPC leadership consists of aging, semi-retired Politburo members and former members plus a sprinkling of minority nationality and women representatives. NPC Chairman Chu Te and six of the vice chairmen are Politburo members or alternates. Four of these leaders are known to be in very poor health, two are members of minority nationalities; the other is Peking chief Wu Te, who is frequently called upon to entertain foreign guests and may have been named to the post to ease protocol problems. Wu was also secretary-general of the session, but following the congress the NPC Standing Committee named Chi Peng-fei, who had been Chinese minister of foreign affairs until last November, to the post. Six former members of the Politburo were also made NPC vice chairmen, as were other perennials, including Sun Yat-sen's widow Soong Ching-ling, Li Fu-chun's widow Tsai Chang, and Lu Hsun's brother Chou Chien-jen. The only possible concession to the principle of "old, middle-aged and young" may have been the naming of a Shensi trade union official as a new vice chairman. Among the members of the standing committee, youth was represented by Chang Tieh-sheng from Liaoning, noted for "going against the tide" on educational policy in the summer of 1973, and Lu Yu-lan from Hopeh, a young woman noted as a revolutionary rural leader. There was some increase in the number of women named to the standing committee, including the wife of purged Politburo member Tao Chu, who did not himself appear at the congress.

Every military region leader was elected a member of the presidium of the NPC, as were most provincial first secretaries. Not reported at the session were Heilungkiang first secretary Wang Chia-tao and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chen-hua, who have apparently been under attack in their provinces and have made no public appearances since early last year other than in Peking on National Day. The only other first secretary not elected to the

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presidium, Tsinghai chief Liu Hsien-chuan, has been occupied with other duties in Peking for years and may have previously lost his post; he made relatively few public appearances last year and was identified only as a Central Committee member or as a PLA official. Tsinghai second secretary and military district commander Chang Chiang-lin was also not elected to the presidium.

III. NEW STATE CONSTITUTION

FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSITION

Although the new constitution contains no direct reference to "Chairman Mao," it formalizes his control over the military by placing the office of the chairman of the CCP in command of the armed forces, a power which the previous constitution, adopted in 1954, had given to the now abolished post of head of state. By focusing on the institutional role of the office of the chairman of the party, rather than on Mao himself, the constitution appears aimed at providing the framework necessary for a smooth organizational transition when Mao eventually leaves the political scene.

The new constitution drops all of the personal references to Mao which were contained in the 1970 draft constitution, a document presumably bearing the imprint of Lin Piao, who has been charged with building a cult of personality around Mao in order to advance his own standing in the party and army. Placing more stress on the party's role in guiding state affairs, the new constitution omits the draft's reference to Mao as "head of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as well as the characterization of Mao as the "supreme commander" of the PLA. Also where the draft said that it is one of the duties of PRC citizens to "support Chairman Mao," the constitution referred to the need to "support the leadership of the CCP." The constitution, however, officially enshrines Mao's Thought, noting that the party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people and that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation."

RIGHT OF COMPLAINT

Aside from the low-keyed treatment given to Mao personally, the only other major difference in the new constitution compared with the 1970 draft version is a passage noting that citizens have the right to lodge written or oral complaints to organs of state at any level

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regarding "transgressions of law or neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of state" and that no one will be allowed to "hinder or obstruct the making of such complaints or retaliate." The right to file complaints without fear of retaliation with higher level authorities was written into the party constitution at the 10th party congress in August 1973 and a similar statement was also included in the list of rights given PRC citizens in the 1954 constitution.

CURTAILED NPC POWERS

The section in the 1954 constitution devoted to the office of the chief of state has been eliminated in the new constitution. The former duties of PRC chief of state--other than his post as PLA commander-in-chief--remain within the NPC and presumably will be exercised by Chu Te as NPC chairman. By making the chairman of the party the commander of the armed forces and by eliminating the office of head of state, a post former PRC Chairman Liu Shao-chi allegedly used as a rival power center to the party, the new constitution strengthens the party's control over the government and weakens NPC powers. Other constitutional provisions also reduce state power. The NPC may now, for example, remove the premier only "on the proposal of the Central Committee of the CCP." The NPC also appears to have lost its former power to declare war and there is no mention of the National Defense Council, a military advisory group which had previously reported to the NPC. NPC members are no longer immune from arrest and have lost the power to grant amnesty.

The NPC does, however, retain its power to "approve" the state budget and it is still characterized as the supreme state organ, although the new constitution carefully notes that the NPC functions under the "leadership of the CCP." The length of office for each NPC has been increased from four to five years which "may be extended under special circumstances." NPC sessions are to be held each year, but may be "advanced or postponed" if necessary. Under the 1954 constitution, the PRC was described as a multiparty "people's democratic" state with power belonging "to the people as represented by the NPC" and local assemblies. Under the new constitution the PRC has officially advanced to the stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" with the working class exercising leadership over the state "through its vanguard, the CCP."

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ECONOMIC PROVISIONS

The constitution does not call for any radical change in the economic policies which have been in force for the past several years. The production team remains the basic accounting unit within the commune, and the farming of small plots for personal needs as well as a limited amount of household sideline production will be continued. Since the PRC is now a "socialist state," the new constitution has dropped the 1954 guarantees of handicraft rights and the right of inheritance. The new constitution also recognizes only two kinds of ownership, socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working people. The 1954 constitution had granted the right of ownership by individual working people and capitalist ownership.

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

The revolutionary committee system, which was set up during the cultural revolution, will form the basis of a new system of local government. Revolutionary committees, which are usually headed by party leaders, are to function as the standing committees for the yet to be elected local people's congresses and as local government organs. Revolutionary committee members will be "elected and subject to recall" by the local people's congresses. The committees and their members are also accountable to the state organ at the next higher level. Local people's congresses and revolutionary committees are to work together to approve local economic plans, safeguard the rights of citizens and "maintain revolutionary order."

JUSTICE, RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

The Western concept of due process under law is given short shrift in the new constitution, which places local judges under the authority of people's congresses and revolutionary committees. The "mass line" is to be followed in trying cases and the previously specified right of the accused to legal defense has been omitted in the new constitution.

PRC citizens apparently have lost the right of "equality before the law" as guaranteed in the 1954 constitution, but have gained the "freedom to strike," a provision Chang Chun-chiao specifically noted in his report on the constitution to the NPC as having been "proposed" by Mao himself. Citizens also now enjoy freedom to believe or not to believe in religion as well as the freedom to "propagate atheism." All nationalities have the freedom to use

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"their own spoken and written languages," but the new constitution fails to reaffirm the right of minorities to "develop" their languages, and it dropped a passage from the 1954 constitution granting minorities the right to "preserve" their habits and customs. Autonomous regions will, however, be allowed to continue as organs of self-government for minority nationalities and to "exercise autonomy within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law."

IV. CHOU EN-LAI ON ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Chou claimed that China "overfulfilled" the third 5-year plan ending in 1970 and that China "will successfully fulfill the fourth 5-year plan this year," but he did not supply any concrete production figures in enumerating PRC economic achievements. Most of the percentage gains claimed by Chou were given in terms of 1964 base levels, which were never publicly released. For grain, however, Chou compared 1974 production with that in 1949, which indicates that the 1974 crop was in the neighborhood of 260 million tons.

Chou denounced "reactionaries" at home and abroad who had claimed that the cultural revolution would "disrupt the development of our national economy," and he gave Mao credit for laying out the general plan for economic development. Chou claimed for the first time that prior to the Third NPC Mao had instructed that the national economy be developed in two stages, beginning with the third 5-year plan. The full text of Chou's speech at the Third NPC was never released, and the lengthy NCNA summary of that speech contained no mention of the plan, concentrating on annual goals instead. According to Chou's current NPC speech, Mao's plan calls for the development by 1980 of an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system that would form the basis for achieving a modern economy in the front ranks of developed countries by the end of the century. Chou clearly indicated that the State Council had fully regained its dominant role in economic planning, stating that it would draw up a 10-year plan as well as the traditional 5-year and annual plans in order to promote the fulfillment of Mao's goal.

V. CHOU EN-LAI ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Chou En-lai's report to the NPC reflected an evolution of the views he had presented in his report at the 10th party congress in August 1973--his last comprehensive discussion of foreign affairs. His much shorter NPC report was particularly notable for its image

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of a world situation markedly favorable to China. Chou did give more credence to the possibility that contention between the superpowers could lead to world war, but his remarks were couched in a theoretical framework and did not picture China as threatened. He assessed Sino-U.S. relations in positive terms, but he bluntly characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill.

WORLD VIEW

Chou departed somewhat from the PRC line on world war and revolution that has been standard for almost five years.* He said that the "fierce contention" between the United States and the Soviet Union "is bound to lead to world war some day," and he was equivocal as to whether war or revolution was more likely, saying that "the factors for both revolution and war are increasing." By contrast, Chou at the 10th party congress had quoted the passage in Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970 statement that while "the danger of new world war still exists," revolution against imperialism is the "main trend" in the world today. The Mao formulation has been frequently quoted in authoritative Chinese comment up to the present. Reflecting his balanced view of war and revolution, Chou appeared sanguine about the strength of the Third World, and he declared that "whether war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents war, in either case the international situation will develop in a direction favorable to the people" This assertion is similar to Lin Piao's remark at the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969 when he cited a Mao quotation to the effect that either world war will give rise to revolution or revolution will prevent war.

Chou's remark on the inevitability at some future time of a military confrontation between the two superpowers seemed aimed primarily at disparaging the notion of a possible relaxation of U.S.-Soviet tensions under the cover of detente. Referring to recent talk of detente and peace around the world, Chou maintained that all the talk merely proves "there is no detente, let alone lasting peace, in this world." Assessing what he saw as progressively increasing U.S.-Soviet contention for world control, Chou indicated that the present "economic crisis" in the "capitalist world" has served to intensify U.S.-Soviet competition, and he repeated his judgment at the 10th party congress that Europe is the present focus of U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

Chou was notably more sanguine about China's own national security than he had been in 1973. He repeated his 1973 slogan playing down the Soviet threat to China in noting that Moscow merely "makes a

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feint to the east while attacking in the west," and he dropped his 1973 additional allegation that the West has always sought to divert the Soviet threat eastward, toward China. Chou also dropped his 1973 admonition against the possible launching of an imperialist war against China and his special warning against "surprise attack" from the USSR. His routine instructions on national defense included calls for the people to maintain "vigilance" and be "prepared" against war. (In 1973 Chou enjoined the people to maintain "high vigilance" and to be "fully prepared" against war.)

Chou voiced continued support for Peking's flexible foreign policy approach under the banner of Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign affairs," and he gave heightened attention to improving ties with the developed countries of the so-called Second World. Thus, he offered Peking's highest level endorsement for West European unity against superpower threats and bullying, and voiced Chinese readiness to promote friendly relations with Japan on the basis of the 1972 Sino-Japanese statements. Chou reaffirmed China's intention never to be a superpower, its solidarity with the Third World, and its intention to uphold proletarian internationalism. He also promised to enhance ties with "socialist countries."

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Chou echoed his assessment at the 10th party congress that Sino-U.S. relations "have improved to some extent" over the past three years. However, he added a phrase giving credit to the United States as well as to the PRC, stating that improvement had been achieved through "joint efforts of both sides." Though Chou noted that "there exist fundamental differences between China and the United States," he expressed confidence that bilateral relations would continue to improve so long as the two countries carry out "in earnest" the principles of the Shanghai communique.

Chou's assurance stands in contrast to his defensive 1973 assessment of PRC ties with Washington, when he had gone to great lengths to rationalize the need for "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries." Suggesting that at that time he was having some difficulty justifying Sino-U.S. detente to more rigid ideologues at home or abroad, Chou at the party congress had cited Leninist scripture to distinguish Peking's new policy from Soviet collaboration with Washington. Observing that "there are compromises and compromises," Chou had hammered his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and contrasted it with the "doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev" as "betrayers of Lenin."

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Chou did not repeat his 1973 references to U.S. "defeats" in Korea and Vietnam and to the "decline" of U.S. power over the past generation. And, although he continued to list the United States ahead of the Soviet Union in commenting on the superpowers, he dropped all reference to "U.S. imperialism," which had been cited frequently in his 1973 report. By contrast, he continued to refer to "Soviet social-imperialism." The premier gave only routine attention to Taiwan, reaffirming determination to "liberate" the island while calling on "fellow countrymen" on Taiwan to join in the liberation struggle.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Though his discussion of the USSR was shorter and less polemical than his anti-Soviet diatribe at the 1973 party congress, Chou characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill, openly attacked Soviet "deception" on the border issue, and challenged Moscow to meet Chinese demands concerning the frontier. Chou accused the "Soviet leading clique" of having betrayed Marxism-Leninism and of having taken a series of actions--including subversion and provoking of armed clashes along the frontier--to worsen state relations with China. Chou repeated charges concerning the Sino-Soviet border and the Peking border talks which were contained in the Chinese message to the USSR on the 6 November 1974, October Revolution anniversary and in an article in the December issue of the Chinese journal HISTORICAL STUDIES.* This represents Chou's first public discussion of the Sino-Soviet border talks, as well as Peking's first authoritative comment on the substance of the negotiations, since they began in October 1969.

Chou claimed that Moscow is totally responsible for the lack of progress because it has refused to adhere to the PRC-USSR understanding reached during the September 1969 Peking meeting between Chou and Kosygin that led to the start of the formal border talks. He said that the understanding included an accord on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, as well as agreement to withdraw forces from disputed border areas.** Chou said that Moscow has

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** This marks the first time Chinese willingness to consider a non-use of force and non-aggression pact with the USSR under terms of the alleged Chou-Kosygin understanding has been reported to the Chinese people. It had been publicized earlier by Peking in the 6 November 1974 PRC message to the USSR, but that message was never publicized for the Chinese domestic audience.

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refused to do anything about withdrawing from disputed areas, and has even denied the existence of disputed border areas. He accused the Russians of talking profusely about "empty treaties" on non-use of force and non-aggression in order to deceive Soviet and world opinion, and advised Moscow to stop its "deceitful tricks," negotiate honestly and "do something" to solve "a bit" of the border problem.

Chou's statement seems to serve notice on the Soviet Union that it must make the next move to improve relations. His remarks, together with other recent Chinese charges over the border talks, recall similar PRC comment two decades ago during the year prior to suspension of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks at Geneva in the mid-50's. In late 1956 Peking media began showing serious agitation over what it termed U.S. intransigence in the talks, and on 10 December 1956 Chou joined the fray. He complained that various Chinese initiatives "had received no corresponding response" from the United States and added that "if the U.S. Government wants to satisfy the desire of the American people for friendship with the peoples of the world, including the Chinese people, they should do something to improve Sino-U.S. relations." Peking's rigid stance led to a complete stalemate in the talks and prompted the United States to suspend the ambassadorial negotiations in December 1957 by withdrawing its representative and failing to name a replacement.

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APPENDIX

STATE COUNCIL OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY THE FOURTH NPC

The NPC State Council posts, indicated in *script*, are listed in the order transmitted by NCNA on 18 January. Other important positions held by the incumbents are also listed. Names of officials who are Politburo members are in upper case.

<u>Position(s) and Officials</u>	<u>Previous Government Position(s)</u>	<u>Status During Cultural Revolution</u>
Premier, CCP Vice Chairman CHOU EN-LAI	Premier	retained post
Vice Premier, CCP Vice Chairman TENG HSIAO-PING	Vice Premier	purged as CCP Secretary-General
Vice Premier, Standing Committee, Shanghai chief CHANG CHUN-CHIAO	None	rose to central party posts
Vice Premier LI HSIEN-NIEN	Vice Premier, Finance Minister	criticized, but remained active
Vice Premier, Peking military region commander CHEN HSI-LIEN	None	Shenyang military region chief
Vice Premier, Peking military region political commissar CHI TENG-KUEI	None	Honan official
Vice Premier, Hunan chief HUA KUO-FENG	None	Hunan official
Vice Premier, Shansi CCP Secretary CHEN YUNG-KUEI	None	Tachai model brigade leader
Vice Premier WU KUEI-HSIEN	None	model worker
Vice Premier, Central Committee Wang Chen	Minister, State Farms and Land Reclamation (1956)	inactive, elected 9th CC

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<u>Position(s) and Officials</u>	<u>Previous Government Position(s)</u>	<u>Status During Cultural Revolution</u>
<i>Vice Premier, Minister of State Planning, Central Committee</i> Yu Chiu-li	Head of State Planning Commission (1972)	criticized, active again from 1968
<i>Vice Premier, Minister of State Capital Construction, Central Committee</i> Ku Mu	Head of State Capital Construction (1965)	inactive
<i>Vice Premier, Central Committee(a)</i> Sun Chien	None	unknown
<i>Minister of Foreign Affairs, Central Committee</i> Chiao Kuan-hua	Minister of Foreign Affairs (1974)	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
<i>Minister of National Defense, CCP Vice Chairman</i> YEH CHIEN-YING	None	active PLA, CCP leader
<i>Minister of Foreign Trade, Central Committee</i> Li Chiang	Minister of Foreign Trade (1973)	Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
<i>Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, Central Committee</i> Fang I	Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (raised to Ministry level 1971)	retained post
<i>Minister of Agriculture and Forestry</i> Sha Feng	Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (1970)	PLA officer
<i>Minister of Metallurgical Industry</i> Chen Shao-kun	Minister of Metallurgical Industry (1971)	PLA officer

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<u>Position(s) and Officials</u>	<u>Previous Government Position(s)</u>	<u>Status During Cultural Revolution</u>
<i>Minister of First Ministry of Machine Building, Central Committee</i> Li Shui-ching	Minister of First Ministry of Machine Building (1971)	Shantung PLA leader
<i>Minister of Second Ministry of Machine Building, Central Committee(a)</i> Liu Hsi-yao	Head, Scientific and Educational Group, State Council (1972)	active in Academy of Sciences
<i>Minister of Third Ministry of Machine Building</i> Li Chi-tai	State Council, unidentified department	Peking military region, Air Force
<i>Minister of Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, Central Committee</i> Wang Cheng	Minister of Fourth Ministry of Machine Building (1963)	criticized, publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Fifth Ministry of Machine Building</i> Li Cheng-fang	National Defense Council (1965)	criticized, publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Sixth Ministry of Machine Building</i> Pien Chiang	Vice Minister of Sixth Ministry of Machine Building (1963)	publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Seventh Ministry of Machine Building</i> Wang Yang	PLA, probably held pre-1966 positions in Posts and Telecommunications	PLA officer
<i>Minister of Coal</i> Hsu Chin-chiang	Minister of Fuel and Chemistry (1971) Vice Minister of Petroleum (1963)	criticized, inactive

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<u>Position(s) and Officials</u>	<u>Previous Government Position(s)</u>	<u>Status During Cultural Revolution</u>
<i>Minister of Petroleum and Chemical Industries</i> Kang Shih-en	Vice Minister of Petroleum (1956)	criticized, publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Water Conservancy and Power, Central Committee</i> Chien Cheng-ying	Vice Minister of Water Conservancy and Power (1952)	relatively inactive
<i>Minister of Light Industry, Central Committee</i> Chien Chih-kuang	Minister of Light Industry (1970), Vice Minister of Textiles (1949)	inactive, elected 9th Central Committee
<i>Minister of Railways</i> Wan Li	None	inactive
<i>Minister of Communications, Central Committee(a)</i> Yeh Fei	None	purged as Fukien party, PLA chief
<i>Minister of Posts and Communications</i> Chung Fu-hsiang	Vice Minister of Posts and Communications (1954)	publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Finance</i> Chang Ching-fu	Vice President, Chinese Academy of Sciences (1956), Vice Chairman, Scientific and Technological Commission (1962)	criticized, purged
<i>Minister of Commerce</i> Fan Tzu-yu	Minister of Commerce (1972)	active in unidentified department, PLA background
<i>Minister of Culture, Central Committee</i> Yu Hui-yung	Deputy head, Cultural Group of State Council (1974)	active in cultural sphere

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<u>Position(s) and Officials</u>	<u>Previous Government Position(s)</u>	<u>Status During Cultural Revolution</u>
<i>Minister of Education</i> Chou Jung-hsin	Secretary-General of State Council (1965), Vice Minister of Education (1961-63)	criticized
<i>Minister of Public Health, Central Committee</i> Liu Hsiang-ping	Minister of Public Health (1973)	publicly inactive
<i>Minister of Physical Culture and Sports Commission, Central Committee</i> Chuang Tse-tung	Vice President, Table Tennis Association (1972)	confessed errors, remained active